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This paper examines the influence of structured savings program
arrangements on the saving performance of low-income households
in individual development accounts (IDAs). Data are drawn from
the American Dream Demonstration (1997-2004), which looked
at the saving performance of low-income households in matched
savings accounts across the United States. Hierarchical multivari-
ate regression is used to identify which specific structural program
arrangements are important in influencing the saving performance
of low-income families. Findings suggest that overall, structured
program arrangements, including financial education, peer men-
toring groups and saving targets are important in influencing
people's saving performance-including low-income families.
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Introduction
Investment-oriented policy strategies to assist the poor
have become increasingly prominent in the last decade. For
example, Michael Sherraden's (1991) work on asset-based
welfare proposes policy that aids and encourages saving and
asset accumulation among the poor, under the assumption
that acquisition and ownership of assets improve economic,
psychological, and social well-being.
A key feature of this policy is the influence of formal and
structured program arrangements on individual asset accu-
mulation. However, the study of structured program arrange-
ments as a predictor of asset accumulation-specifically among
low-income families-is only starting to emerge. Although a
larger body of how fundamental/macro components of social
structures influence individual behaviors and outcomes exists
(e.g., Gordon, 1980; Green, 1991; Neale, 1987), there is little
research that explicitly connects structured program arrange-
ments to asset-accumulation in low-income households.
To date, the largest and most comprehensive study in this
area is the American Dream Demonstration (ADD). ADD is a
study of individual development accounts (IDAs), which are
matched savings accounts for low-income households. IDAs
are specifically designed to increase savings for the poor and
are used for specific asset purchases, including homeowner-
ship, post-secondary education, microenterprise development,
and retirement. A financial education component, intended to
help participants gain more knowledge about issues regarding
financial management, is a requirement for each participant in
the program.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the emerg-
ing research on the role of structured program arrangements/
institutions in individual asset and wealth accumulation,
particularly in low-income households. The paper provides
a closer examination of the emerging institutional theory of
saving (Sherraden, 1991; Beverly & Sherraden, 1999) as an im-
portant framework that may help explain the saving perfor-
mance and asset accumulation of low-income households in
the United States. Specifically, the paper answers the following
key question: Controlling for income and several measurable
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individual characteristics, do structured program arrange-
ments matter in influencing the saving performance and asset
accumulation of low-income households?
Background
The institutional theory of saving mentioned earlier sug-
gests that structured program arrangements (also referred to
as institutional factors) greatly influence individual's ability to
save. According to this theory, saving and asset accumulation
are primarily a result of structured arrangements that involve
explicit connections, rules, incentives and subsidies (Sherraden,
1991). Several theorists maintain that such structured arrange-
ments matter in shaping and influencing opportunities and be-
haviors (see Neale 1987; North 1990; Sherraden, 1991; Weaver
& Rockman 1993; Beverly & Sherraden 1999; Peters, 1999).
This suggested link between structured arrangements or insti-
tutions and financial well-being may have important implica-
tions in social policy. For example, Sherraden (1991) observes,
the middle-class "participates in retirement pension systems
...not [as] a matter of making superior choices. Instead, a
priori choices are made by social policy, and individuals walk
into the pattern that has been established" (p. 127). Given the
premise of institutional theory, this paper posits that low-
income households are not able to save and accumulate assets
primarily because they do not have the same institutional op-
portunities that higher-income households receive. Otherwise,
provided with access to the same institutional frameworks that
their higher-income counterparts utilize, low-income house-
holds might be in position to save and accumulate assets. It is
against this background that the institutional question in this
paper is being addressed.
The answer to the question guiding this paper: the role of
structured program arrangements in influencing the saving
performance and asset accumulation of low-income house-
holds, is important for at least two reasons: First, one would be
justified to argue that because saving is hard for most people,
it is even harder for those with low incomes. Therefore, the
ability to clarify the role of structured program arrangements
in facilitating the saving performance and asset accumulation
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of low-income households would be a step in the right direc-
tion. This clarification may help initiate the move toward more
inclusive social policy and program proposals which could
provide low-income households with the same opportunities
to participate in saving and asset accumulation programs as
their higher-income counterparts. Second, given the on-going
discussion in the policy arena about an ownership society,
which includes low-income households (Boshara, Cramer &
Parrish, 2005), results from this study may contribute to the
debate by providing knowledge on how programs and poli-
cies toward an ownership society could be structured, tested
and implemented.
Traditional Theories of Saving
Existing theories on saving and asset accumulation focus
on economic and socio-psychological perspectives. Economic
theory focuses on individual preferences and opportuni-
ties in response to changes in incentives. For the economist,
savings are looked at as a surplus of resources after consump-
tion choices have been decided. Two of the more recognized
economic theories of saving are: (1) the life-cycle hypothesis
(LHC) [Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando, 1957;
Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954] and, (2) the permanent-income
hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). These theories view savings as
a way of balancing the fluctuation of household resources for
consumption throughout a lifetime. The LHC, for example,
assumes that consumption and saving patterns reflect an in-
dividual's age or stage within the life cycle, with a significant
amount of saving occurring in the middle years. The perma-
nent-income hypothesis suggests savings decisions are based
on income being perceived as either permanent or temporary.
According to this model, changes in household consumption
over time occur only in response to permanent income and not
temporary income (Friedman, 1957).
In addition to the economic theories, there are the socio-
psychological theories of saving (Cohen, 1994; Duesenberry,
1949; Katona, 1975). These theories posit that individual's pref-
erences change in response to economic and social variations,
thus, people's motives, aspirations and expectations influence
their saving choices.
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Although there is reason to believe that saving may be
an attribute of individual traits, preferences and income rela-
tive to consumption, studies have begun to arise explicitly ac-
knowledging the role of deliberately designed and structured
program arrangements or formal institutional mechanisms in
influencing the saving performance of individuals. In other
words, individual attributes and income may not be enough
in explaining the saving behavior of individuals. Institutions,
specifically formal policies and program arrangements, may
be equally important.
Institutional Theory of Saving
The institutional theory of saving recognizes the important
role that structured arrangements play in savings. The theo-
retical framework advances five constructs as being instru-
mental in predicting individual saving and asset accumula-
tion, particularly among low-income households: 1) access, 2)
information, 3) incentives, 4) facilitation, and 5) expectations
(Sherraden, 1991; Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 1999;
Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003).
Access. This construct refers to institutional mechanisms
that make the depositing process more available, for example,
number of available deposit locations per participant within
a given distance and no minimum balance required. When
access to these means is permitted, savings rates are likely to
be higher.
Information. The assumption behind information-as
an important institutional determinant of saving normally
offered through financial education-is that when people are
made more aware of their savings options and opportunities,
savings will be higher. Often financial education is provided
to employees whose companies offer pension plans. Studies
report that when financial education is offered to employees,
participation levels are higher (Bayer, Bernheim, & Scholz,
1996; Bernheim & Garrett, 1996).
Incentives. This construct represents efforts to motivate
higher savings. Interest rates and rates of return on invest-
ments are the most familiar. The proposition is that, gener-
ally, an increase in the rate of return will cause an increase
in savings. Empirical evidence confirms the positive effects
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of employer matching on participation rates in savings
programs (Engelhardt & Kumar, 2003; Engelhardt & Kumar,
2007; Huberman, Sethi-lyenger & Jiang, 2007; Mitchell, Utkus,
& Yang, 2005).
Facilitation. These are institutional arrangements that
provide mechanisms that make saving more manageable.
These mechanisms can be in the form of direct deposit,
online banking services and automatic enrolling in programs.
Overall, the proposition is that these arrangements will more
likely increase individual savings. Although empirical evi-
dence on facilitation is limited at this time, one study on 401(k)
participation finds participation and contributions rates to be
higher after the employer started automatically enrolling em-
ployees into the 401(k) plans (Madrian & Shea, 2000).
Expectations. This construct refers to the specific saving
goals, targets and rules communicated to participants by the
programs. Individuals with specific saving expectations are
more likely to save more than individuals with no saving
expectations.
Based on the institutional theory of saving, IDAs were
developed as a policy initiative that could help provide poor
people with the opportunity and structured mechanisms to
save money (Sherraden, 1990, 1991).
Data
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) was designed
to test the IDA saving model. ADD involved 14 programs at
13 sites around the country selected from 250 interested com-
munity-based organizations through a competitive process to
design, implement, and run IDA programs (see Table 1).
The study followed over 2,000 low-income (200 percent
of poverty or less) participants across the United States for
four years (1997-2001). All participants were tracked through
a data management program called Management Information
System for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA).
Program staff collected monitoring data with MIS IDA, which
incorporated a quality control component. Savings data came
from monthly passbook savings account records from deposi-
tory institutions. The socio-economic and demographic infor-
mation used in this study was gathered at time of enrollment.
Institutions & Savings in Low Income Households 15
Table 1. Host organizations in ADD
Host Organization Type of Targeted Participants for
and Location Organization IDAs
ADVOCAP
Fond du Lac, WI
Alternatives Federal
Credit Union
Ithaca, NY
Bay Area IDA
Collaborative
(formerly EBALDC)
Oakland, CA
Capital Area Asset
Building Corporation
(CAAB)
Washington, D.C.
Foundation
Communities
(formerly Central Texas
Mutual Housing)
Austin, TX
Central Vermont
Community Action
Council (CVCAC)
Barre, VT
Community Action
Project of Tulsa County
(CAPTC)
Tulsa, OK
Heart of America
Family Services
Kansas City, MO
Mercy Corps (formerly
Human Solutions)
Portland, OR
MACED/Owsley
County Action Team
Berea, KY
Near Eastside IDA
Program
Indianapolis, IN
Shorebank Corporation
Chicago, IL
Women's Self-
Employment Project
(WSEP)
Chicago, IL
Community action
agency
Community develop-
ment credit union
Collaborative of 13
community-based
organizations
Collaborative of 8
community-based
organizations
Not-for-profit housing
organization
Community action
agency and com-
munity development
corporation
Community-based anti-
poverty organization
Community-based
family-services agency
Social-service
organization
Association of com-
munity development
organizations
Social-service organi-
zation/Community
development credit
union
Community develop-
ment bank with not-
for-profit affiliate
Microenterprise
development
organization
Former AFDC/TANF recipi-
ents; the working poor
Single parents; youth
Low-income Asian Americans;
African Americans; Hispanics
TANF recipients; youth;
African Americans; Hispanics;
Asian Americans
Rental property residents;
youth
TANF recipients; youth
Small-scale: Working families
with children at or below 200%
of poverty.
Large-scale: at or below 150%
of poverty.
Hispanics; African Americans
Rental property residents
Rental property residents; the
working poor
Neighborhood residents; youth
Rental property residents;
Shorebank customers
Low-income, self-employed
women; public-housing
residents
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ADD used an extensive multi-method research design
to gather as much information as possible concerning the
effectiveness of the programs in terms of the communities,
participants and administration in order to inform IDA policy
and program development outside of ADD (Sherraden et
al., 2000). This study uses two specific data sets out of ADD:
(1) data gathered from MIS IDA (described above) and (2) a
survey conducted on the 14 ADD programs. The survey was
administered using a combination of both face-to-face and
telephone interviews with personnel from ADD programs. The
interview questions were based on the institutional constructs
suggested in Sherraden (1991) and Beverly and Sherraden's
(1999) institutional theory of saving. The program survey
data were merged with the ADD participant data. The total
participant sample size for this study is 2,211.
Dependent Variable: Saving Performance
This study uses average monthly net deposit (AMND), as the
measure of saving performance. This measure is consistent
with measures used in prior research on ADD (see Sherraden et
al., 2000; Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner, Clancy & Sherraden,
2002; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004).
AMND measures the specific dollar amount of a partici-
pant's average monthly deposit. It is net deposit divided by
the number of participation months, thus controlling for length
of participation in an IDA program. Higher AMND implies
higher savings.
AMND = Deposit + Interest-Unmatched withdrawals-
Unmatchable deposits
Total number of months of participation
The variable net deposit, used to calculate AMND, is defined
as deposits plus earned interest minus unmatched withdraw-
als (withdrawals that do not qualify for matching funds). Net
deposit includes matched withdrawals, but excludes unmatch-
able deposits in excess of the match cap (ceiling on the match-
able deposits within a specified time period) or after the time
cap period (limit on the time frame for which participants are
allowed to deposit matchable funds). Deposits over the match
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cap and after the time cap are excluded because, although the
extra deposited amounts are considered savings, they are not
considered IDA savings. Given that participants may have other
types of savings that are not included in the saving measure
for this study, adding in the extra deposits over and above the
match cap and after the time cap might bias the results. The
average AMND for this study population is $18.44.
Independent Variables: Individual Participant Characteristics
Individual participant demographic and financial charac-
teristics are used as controls in this analysis. They include age,
gender, dependency ratio (calculated by dividing the house-
hold size by the number of adults in the household), race/eth-
nicity, education level, employment, marital status, rural resi-
dency, car ownership, home ownership, business ownership,
ownership of checking or savings account, income-to-poverty
ratio (calculated by multiplying monthly household income
by 12 and then dividing it by the official family-size-adjusted
poverty guideline), income, net worth (calculated by subtract-
ing total liabilities from total assets), and never having been
on TANF (public assistance use) (see Table 2 for details). As
mentioned earlier, all of these variables are measured at the
time of enrollment.
Independent Variables: Institutional Characteristics
Access is a continuous variable indicating the number of
deposit locations available to participants. Hypothesis: the
greater the number of deposit locations, the greater the saving
performance.
Information is measured by: (1) Financial education, a con-
tinuous variable indicating hours of financial education taken
by each participant. A multi-joint spline' is used creating 3 dif-
ferent segments: 1-6 hours, 7-12 hours, and 13 or more hours.
In addition, a dummy variable was created for people with
no hours of financial education. It is important to note that al-
though financial education was a required component for all
sites, the amount taken varied between programs because each
program designed its own curriculum. Hypothesis: The greater
the number of financial education hours attended, the greater
the saving performance; (2) Peer mentoring is a dichotomous
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Table 2. ADD participant characteristics
Characteristics
Demographics
Gender
Female=80% Male=20%
Age Mean=36, St. Dev.=10
13-19=4% 20s=26% 30s=36% 40s=25% 50s=7% 60-72=2%
Race/Ethnicity
African American=44% Asian-American or Pacific Islander=2%
Caucasian=40% Hispanic=9% Native American=3% Other=3%
Marital Status
Never Married=47% Married=22%
Divorced or Separated=28% Widowed=2%
Education
< High School Diploma=15% High School Diploma or GED=25%
Attended Some College=37% College Degree=23%
Employment
Employed Full-time=58% Employed Part-time=24%
Student=8% Unemployed=10%
Family
Family Type
One Adult w/Children=45% One Adult/No Children=15%
_> 2 Adults w/Children=30% > 2 Adults/No Children=9%
Dependency Ratio Mean=2.3, St. Dev.=1.24
Rural Residency=14%
Financial
Car Ownership=67% Home Ownership=17%
Business Ownership=11% Either Checking or Savings Account=77%
Never Used TANF=61%
Monthly Income Mean=$1,364, St. Dev.=7.01
Income to Poverty Ratio Mean=105, St. Dev.=.68
0-49=20% 50-74=13% 75-99=16% 100-124=14% 125-149=12%
150-174=9% 175-199=6% 200-327=8%
Net Worth Mean=$3,136, St. Dev.=194
N=2,211
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variable indicating whether a program offered group mentor-
ing programs to IDA participants in addition to financial edu-
cation. Hypothesis: the more peer modeling and information
sharing, the greater the saving performance.
Incentives are measured by match rates, ranging from 1:1
to 6:1. For example, a match rate of 2:1 indicates that for every
dollar a participant saved, it was matched with two dollars
from the IDA program. For the purpose of this study, dummy
variables are created to examine the influence of each level
of match rate. The variables are 1:1, 2:1, 3:1+. Hypothesis: the
higher the match rate, the greater the saving performance.
Facilitation is measured by direct deposit, a dichotomous
variable. Hypothesis: the more automatic the system (such as
automatic deposit), the greater the saving performance.
Table 3. ADD institutional characteristics
Institutional Characteristics Percentage
Access
Number of deposit locations Mean=17, St. Dev.-21.56
Information
Peer mentoring groups 34%
Hours of financial education attended Mean=10, St. Dev.=7.57
0 education hours 9%
1-6 education hours 15%
7-12 education hours 50%
13 or more education hours 24%
Incentives
Match rate Mean=2, St. Dev.=.91
1:1 27%
2:1 51%
3:1 and higher 21%
Facilitation
Program offered direct deposit 80%
Expectations
Monthly savings target Mean=$42.14, St. Dev.=20.47
N 2,211
Expectations are measured by monthly savings target, a
continuous variable that represents the ratio of total match cap
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to the time cap. Hypothesis: the higher the monthly savings
target, the greater the saving performance. For details on insti-
tutional variables, see Table 3.
Method
To address the research question guiding this paper, a
hierarchical multivariate analysis is utilized. This analysis
procedure examines the incremental changes of R2, the percent-
age of variance in the dependent variable, in this case AMND,
in a regression model due to the addition of individual vari-
ables or blocks of variables introduced in a specified hierar-
chy at certain points in the regression (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
Specifically, the measure of saving performance, AMND, is
regressed on three blocks of independent variables. The first
block (Model 1) consists of the individual participant charac-
teristics and is entered into the model to determine the vari-
ance explained in AMND without the institutional variables
added. The measurable institutional variables block is intro-
duced in the second model (Model 2) to determine the indi-
vidual influence of each of the institutional characteristics on
saving performance as well as their unique contribution as a
block to the incremental changes in the variance explained in
AMND when controlling for participant characteristics. In the
third block (Model 3), program dummies, which are unmea-
sured institutional characteristics, are entered to determine
their unique contribution to variance explained in AMND. The
specified hierarchy of this regression model is guided by the
theoretical framework of this study.
Results
Multivariate Analysis: Individual Participant Characteristics and
AMND
Gender, age, marital status, and dependency ratio are not
significantly associated with saving performance (AMND)
as well as never having been on TANF, business ownership,
income and net worth (see Table 4 for complete regression
results).
Three categories of race/ethnicity have a significant asso-
ciation with saving performance. Compared with Caucasians,
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression analysis: Individual characteristics
and Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND)
Model 1
Independent Variables b se
Intercept 12.35"* 3.80
Participant Characteristics: Demographics
Female -1.20 1.23
Age 1.54 0.50
Race/Ethnicity Caucasian (reference group)
African American -7.13** 1.12
Hispanic 2.78 1.76
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 14.57** 3.24
Native American -6.82* 2.78
Other Ethnicity 2.93 2.76
Education Completed a Degree (reference group)
No High School Diploma -7.28** 1.62
High School Diploma or GED -6.86** 1.35
Attended Some College -5.13"* 1.22
Employment Unemployed (reference group)
Employed Full-time 1.36 1.61
Employed Part-time 2.87 1.70
Student 5.03* 2.15
Marital Married (reference group)
Single - Never Married -1.27 1.32
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed 0.02 1.39
Dependency Ratio -0.49 0.42
Rural Residency -4.16** 1.41
Participant Characteristics: Financial
Asset Ownership
Car 3.61** 1.07
Home 6.30** 1.46
Business 1.90 1.48
Checking or Savings Account 6.24** 1.16
Never on TANF -0.12 1.02
Monthly Income 0.14 0.07
Net Worth -2.08 1.39
p< .05 **p< .01
b = unstandardized coefficient, se = standard error
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Table 5. Hierarchical regression analysis: Individual and institution-
al characteristics and Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND)
Model 2
Independent Variables b se
Intercept -10.62* 5.00
Participant Characteristics: Demographics
Female -1.09 1.16
Age 0.08 1.15
Race/Ethnicity Caucasian (reference group)
African American -3.33** 1.12
Hispanic 4.51 1.68
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 14.08** 3.03
Native American -6.78* 2.59
Other Ethnicity 5.08 2.59
Education Completed a Degree (reference group)
No High School Diploma -4.45** 1.52
High School Diploma or GED -4.65** 1.27
Attended Some College -4.00** 1.14
Employment Unemployed (reference group)
Employed Full-time -0.78 1.54
Employed Part-time 0.78 1.60
Student 5.99* 2.01
Marital Married (reference group)
Single - Never Married -0.86 1.24
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed 0.30 1.30
Dependency Ratio -0.66 0.39
Rural Residency -5.11** 1.43
Participant Characteristics: Financial
Asset Ownership
Car 2.27* 1.01
Home 7.22** 1.41
Business 0.79 1.41
Checking or Savings Account 3.40** 1.10
Never on TANF 0.44 .96
Monthly Income 0.14 0.07
Net Worth 0.00 0.00
*p< .05 **p 
.01
b = unstandardized coefficient, se = standard error
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Table 5. Hierarchical regression analysis: Individual and institu-
tional characteristics and Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND),
[continued from previous page]
Model 2
Independent Variables b se
Institutional Characteristics
Number of deposit locations (access) 0.03 0.03
Peer mentoring groups (information) 8.19"* 1.16
Financial education (information)
0 education hours -0.15 3.28
1-6 education hours 1.23" 0.56
7-12 education hours 1.76"* 0.26
13 or more education hours 0.01 0.09
Match rate (incentives) 1:1 (reference group)
2:1 -1.67 1.18
3:1 and higher -2.06 1.63
Direct deposit (facilitation) 0.64 1.40
Monthly savings target (expectations) 0.25** 0.03
R2  0.28
N 2,211
*p_ .05 **p< .01
b = unstandardized coefficient, se = standard error
AMND is $3.33 lower for African Americans (b= -3.33, p_<
0.01) and $6.78 lower for Native Americans (b= -6.78, p< 0.05);
whereas AMND for Asians is $14.08 higher (b= 14.08, p_<
0.01).
Education is significantly related to saving performance.
Compared to those participants who have a college degree
(2-year, 4-year, or unspecified), all other categories are linked
with a statistically significant lower AMND. For example,
participants without a high school diploma save $4.45 less than
participants with a college degree (b= -4.45, p_< 0.01), participants
with a high school diploma or GED save $4.65 less than par-
ticipants with a college degree (b= -4.65, p< 0.01), and partici-
pants with some college save $4.00 less than participants with
a college degree (b= -4.00, p_< 0.01).
For employment, students are linked with a $5.99 increase
in AMND compared to participants who are unemployed
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(b= 5.99, p_< 0.05). There are no significant differences on saving
performance between unemployed participants (the refer-
ence group) and those employed full time, or those employed
part-time.
Rural residency has a significant relationship with saving
performance. AMND is $5.11 less for participants residing in
rural areas compared to participants living in urban areas (b=
-5.11, p!5 0.01).
Car ownership is significantly linked to saving performance.
Compared to participants who are not car owners, car owners
have a $2.27 higher AMND (b= 2.27, p_5 0.05).
Home ownership is associated with higher saving perfor-
mance. Homeowners show a $7.22 higher AMND than partici-
pants who do not own their own homes (b= 7.22, p___ 0.01).
Having either a checking or savings account or both is signifi-
cantly related to saving performance. Participants with either a
checking account, savings account or both are associated with
over $3 higher in AMND (b=3.40, p< 0.01) than participants
who had neither account.
Multivariate Analysis: Institutional Characteristics and AMND
The institutional characteristics access, incentives and fa-
cilitation were not significantly related to savings outcomes in
this study. Table 5 presents the detailed regression results for
the institutional characteristics.
The findings support both hypotheses related to informa-
tion: (1) the more peer modeling and information sharing, the
greater the saving performance; and (2) the greater the number
of financial education hours attended, the greater the saving
performance. Specifically, participants who are in programs
that offer peer mentoring groups, AMND is $8.19 higher than
for participants in programs that do not have peer mentoring
groups (b= 8.19, p< 0.01). These findings are consistent with
Ssewamala and Sherraden (2004) and with the survey of rural
IDA programs (Grinstein-Weiss & Curley, 2003).
Moreover, the amount of financial education hours attend-
ed by participants is significantly associated with saving per-
formance in two categories. Having attended between 1 and 6
hours of financial education and having attended between 7
and 12 hours of financial education is significantly associated
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with AMND. Specifically, for each additional hour attended
between I and 6, AMND increases by $1.23 (b= 1.23, p___ 0.05).
For each additional hour between 7 and 12, AMND increases
by $1.76 (b= 1.76, p< 0.01). On the other hand, having 13 or
more hours of financial education is not significantly linked to
saving performance. These findings support earlier research
on financial education in ADD (Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner,
Clancy, & Sherraden, 2002; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004).
The findings also support the hypothesis that the higher
the monthly savings target (expectation), the greater the saving
performance. Specifically, for every additional $1 in monthly
savings target, AMND increases by $0.25 (b= 0.25, p _ 0.01).
Table 6. Hierarchical regression results: Influence of institutional
characteristics on Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND)
Model R2  Adjusted R2R 2  
Model 1: Individual characteristics
Gender, age, race, education, employment, marital
status, dependency ratio, residency, asset ownership, 0.16 0.15
banking experience, TANF use, monthly income, net
worth
Model 2: Individual characteristics + institutional
characteristics
Number of deposit locations, peer mentoring groups, 0.28 0.27 0.12"*
financial education attended, match rate, direct
deposit offered, monthly savings target
Model 3: Individual characteristics + institutional charac-
teristics + program dummies
ADVOCAP, Alternative Federal Credit Union, Bay
Area IDA Collaborative, Central Vermont Community
Action Council, Community Action Project of Tulsa, 0.31 0.29 0.03**
OK, Foundation Communities, Heart of America
Family Services, Mercy Corps, MACED, Near
Eastside IDA Program, Shorebank Corporation,
Women's Self-Employment Project
N 2,211
*p< 
.01
Estimated "Block" Contributions to the Explained Variance in
AMND
As indicated in Table 6, when only the block of participant
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characteristics are entered into the first model (Model 1), the
variance explained in AMND is 16 percent (R2=0.16). After
the institutional characteristic block is introduced (Model 2),
the variance explained increases to 28 percent (R2=0.28), in-
dicating a change in R2 of 0.12 or 12 percent. The change is
statistically significant (p_< 0.01). Furthermore, when program
dummies (unmeasured program characteristics) are added, R2
significantly increases by another 3 percent. This change is also
statistically significant (p___ 0.01). The total variance explained
by all three blocks of independent variables in Model 3 is 31
percent (R2=0.31).
Limitations
Institutional designs of the IDA programs were not ran-
domly assigned which meant that programs could select their
own design plan, based in part on how they perceived partici-
pants' behavior. Also, participants were not randomly chosen
to participate. Most of the IDA programs targeted certain pop-
ulations; therefore, the results do not reflect the overall low-
income population. Sherraden, et al., (2000) used data from
the ninth wave of the 1993 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) from the United States Census Bureau to
compare the ADD population to the general low-income pop-
ulation in the U.S. Compared to the U.S. population ADD par-
ticipants are more likely to be single, female, employed, and
African American as well as more educated.
In addition, a lack of control or comparison group for
this data set limits confidence in the results. One of the pos-
sible problems is endogeneity bias. For example in this study,
monthly savings target (independent variable) is a predictor
of AMND (dependent variable); when savings targets increase
AMND increase too. However, some of the programs might
have assumed certain participants could save more so they
gave them higher targets (Sherraden et al., 2000). Thus, par-
ticipants who save more would have higher targets, while par-
ticipants who save less would have lower targets, but the re-
lationship would be misleading (Schreiner et al., 2001). Other
variables may also be affected by this bias.
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Discussion
Several individual participant characteristics are related to
savings performance. African Americans and Native Ameri-
cans show significantly lower AMNDs compared to their
Caucasian counterparts. This finding may partly be a reflection
of the institutional discrimination based on race or other dif-
ferences. In any case, although some racial groups are saving
less than others, the main idea here is that all racial groups are
saving and would even probably do better given more institu-
tional opportunities. Thus, enforcing inclusive policies like the
community reinvestment act (12 U.S.C. 2901, implemented by
regulations 12 CFR parts 25; 228; 345, and 563e) may be helpful
in ensuring that racial minorities have more access to institu-
tional forms of saving and asset accumulation.
Education is also important in savings performance. The
higher the participant's education level, the higher the AMND.
This relationship may exist because either more education in-
creases financial sophistication or that increased education
as a form of human capital demonstrates future orientation.
In the employment category, students have a higher AMVND
compared to those participants who are unemployed. One
explanation for this occurrence could be that students may
use part of their grant money or student loans to deposit into
their IDAs in lump sums. There may also be some unobserved
characteristics related to students that predispose them more
to saving than other groups of people. For example, students
may be more focused toward the future and more savvy about
saving.
Rural residents have a significantly lower AMND than
urban residents. Grinstein-Weiss and Curley (2003) report two
main challenges that may influence saving outcomes in rural
areas. First, the lack of infrastructure in many rural areas leaves
participants with fewer resources and options to maintain and
manage their IDA accounts compared to urban participants.
Second, distance is an issue. For participants who live outside
of town, attending financial education classes is sometimes a
problem because they either lack transportation or do not have
enough time to get from work to class. Moreover, the trans-
action costs involved in depositing may be higher for rural
participants.
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Finally, the findings in this study indicate that owning
certain forms of assets (homes, cars, and checking and/or
savings accounts) may be predictive of saving performance
in IDAs. As Sherraden (1991) observes, owning assets may
"create a cognitive and emotional orientation towards the
future and stimulate the development of other assets" (p. 181).
Under these assumptions, the initial possession of assets helps
provide a foundation that may encourage greater asset accu-
mulation in the future. It may also be that ownership of other
assets is a proxy for successful financial functioning that is
long-standing.
Even more important, however, results indicate that insti-
tutions do have an effect on the savings performance of low-
income households, particularly through information and ex-
pectations. An additional hour of financial education between
7 and 12 hours is linked with a $1.76 increase. For example,
attending 9 hours of financial education is linked with a $3.52
increase in AMND. This is a fairly large effect considering the
average AMND for this data set is $18.44. Again, the increase
in AMND for those participants in programs with peer men-
toring groups ($8.19) is a substantial increase. The significant
relationship with financial education and peer mentoring
groups is an indication that providing financial information,
peer encouragement, support, and sharing the challenges and
experiences of the saving process with other participants may
be useful. Thus, programs should design programs according-
ly. For example, to maximize the benefits for participants and
minimize their own costs, programs could provide a combina-
tion of formal financial education up to approximately 12 hours
and establish peer mentoring programs. With this alternative,
participants could receive factual financial information from
the classes and emotional support and encouragement from
the peer mentoring programs. Providing more assistance and
knowledge about options and returns on investments might
also increase contribution rates with higher matches.
The positive association of the monthly savings target with
AMND is a large effect. For every $1 increase in the monthly
target, AMND increases by $0.25. If the monthly saving target
is increased by $10, AMND increases by $2.50. These results
support institutional theory which suggest that higher match
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caps may be associated with higher saving performance
because participants mentally convert match caps into goals
(Schreiner et al., 2001). Using this knowledge, program ad-
ministrators may want to emphasize specific objectives and
guidelines. Policymakers and program administrators should
concentrate on the right mixture of conventions to help shape
and support participants saving, not mandate it.
The hierarchical regression reveals that institutions make
a measurable and significant contribution in explaining the
variance in R2. The 12 percent increase between Model 1 and
Model 2 supports the institutional theory of saving that sug-
gests when institutional mechanisms are offered to low-income
households, savings increase. This finding is corroborated by
the significant outcomes of the individual information and
expectation construct measures. Furthermore, the increase in
variance explained in the 3 rd model provides evidence that un-
observed program variables are related to saving outcomes,
which are most likely aspects of the IDA programs. These vari-
ables might include strong leadership, staff commitment, staff
skill, and other factors.
Although the explained variance is only 16 percent for
institutional effects, these results provide evidence that insti-
tutions play a role in low-income saving. The results are im-
portant because institutional arrangements can be affected by
policy, however, more research needs to be conducted to better
specify the institutional model and to identify both the appro-
priate mix and the unobserved institutional characteristics that
might affect saving and have yet to be measured.
Conclusion
Evidence from ADD indicates that the poor can save.
Sufficient evidence exists to support the creation of institution-
al mechanisms to encourage the poor to save. Results from this
study can help policymakers understand the role of institu-
tions, and create more successful programs to promote saving
and asset accumulation among populations that generally do
not have access to institutionalized saving mechanisms.
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Endnotes
1. A spline takes one variable and divides it into separate parts with
the sum of all the new segments equaling the total number in the
original variable. In the case of financial education, if a person has
had 11 hours of financial education, the 1-6 spline would show 6
hours of financial education, the 7-12 spline would show 5 hours
and the 13-18 spline and 19 or more spline would show 0 hours
of financial education. Furthermore, the sum of the means of each
spline equal the mean of the original variable.
